1. CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE. The most fundamental assumption of Conceptual Semantics, which is advocated by Jackendoff 1983 Jackendoff , 1987a , is that meanings are mentally represented. According to this theory, the organization of languages includes three autonomous levels of structure: phonological, syntactic, and semantic/conceptual.
It follows then that conceptual structure is essentially the form in which thought is couched.
Jackendoff 1987a claims that there are four fundamental distinctions in conceptual structure. They are (a) distinction in verb type, (b) distinction in semantic field or field modifier type, (c) EVENT/STATE distinction, and (d) TYPE/TOKEN distinction.
Let us briefly overview these distinctions. It is quite often observed that the verbs of non-spatial meaning appear in patterns parallel to those of spatial verbs. For instance, consider the following data.
(1) a. The dog ran from the door to the table. b. Max was in Africa.
112 ENGLISH LINGUISTICS, VOLUME 5 (1988) c. Stanley remained in Africa. (2) a. Harry gave the book to Betty. b. The book belonged to the library. c. The iguana stayed in Max's possession. (3) a. The coach changed from a handsome young man into a pumpkin. b. The coach was a turkey. c. The poor coach remained a pumpkin. What is described in each sentence can be regarded as the motion of an object in (a), the location of an object in (b), and the maintenance of the location over a period of time in (c). Within Conceptual Semantics, these parallels are represented by assuming that the verbs in (a), (b), and Of course, these functions alone are not sufficient. The basic notion of what it is to be 'in a place' differs from 1-3. It is 'to be in a spatial position' in 1, 'to be owned by someone' in 2, and 'to have a property or be in a category' in 3. These differences are expressed by the type of field modifier attached to each function. It is Spatial for physical motion and location, Possessional for possession, and Identificational for identification.
(i. e. distinctions in field modifier type) The EVENT/STATE distinction has to do with temporal structure. In fact, Jackendoff 1983 proposes three tests for this distinction: (i) EVENTS, but not STATES, occur in the construction what happened was that..., (ii) with STATES, the (durational) simple present tense can express present time; and (iii) with EVENTS, present time is expressed not by simple present but by present progressive aspect. Of these three, however, the 'what happened' test is rather loose. Progressive aspect is sometimes barred by another factor (for instance, punctuality of the verb).1 So we will use the simple present as the reliable test throughout this paper.
Finally, the representation of the thing being categorized is referred to as a [TOKEN] concept and that of the category as a [TYPE] concept. This distinction will not be relevant in the following discussion, however.
Conceptual structure is thus capable of handling the phenomenon as keys. I am indebted to Nobuhiro Kaga and Prof. Nakau for this insight.
seen in 1-3, which might be called cross-field generalization. But its remarkable advantage is that it provides a way of unifying various uses of the same morphological verb. For instance, turn into has the following two uses.
(4) a. The coach turned into a driveway. b. The coach turned into a pumpkin. 4a describes a physical motion, and 4b a change of one's status. Hence turn into is a GO-verb. And the semantic field is Spatial in 4a, Identificational in 4b. In both cases, the whole structure corresponds to an EVENT. A pumpkin in 4b represents a category and is assigned the TYPE. But except for this NP every constituent in 4 expresses one particular instance and hence is assigned the feature TOKEN. We thus get the following conceptual structures. The correspondences between syntactic and conceptual positions are the same in both cases, indicating that the verb is fundamentally the same. Conceptual structure thus enables us to capture the lexical generality.
In the next section, we will posit conceptual structures for strike based on the three distinctions (field, EVENT/STATE, and verb type), with the hope of achieving the lexical generality in this case as well.
2. STRIKE. Strike has the following three uses having to do with psychological meaning.
(6) a. He strikes me as being honest. (A) b. The idea strikes me. (B) (=The idea is striking to me.) c. An idea struck me. (C) (=An idea occurred to me.) For convenience' sake, we will henceforth refer to these types as (A), (B), and (C). Let us see in turn how the three distinctions are to be specified in each conceptual structure.
2.1. FIELD. We begin with field modifiers. (A)-(C) all involve one's mental process. But (B) differs from the other two in describing an emotive process, whereas (A) and (C) are noncommittal about one's emotive aspect.2 This difference manifests itself in that only (B) has an adjectival version followed by a to-PP, just like a typical emotional reaction predicate surprise. (7) a. The idea is striking to me. b. The news is surprising to me. We will refer to this field distinction between (A) and (C), on the one hand, and (B), on the other, as Cognitive/Emotive.
2.2. EVENT/STATE. Both (A) and (B) correspond to a STATE, so that they can be in the simple present.
(8) Mary strikes Pete as being unfriendly.
(9) The idea strikes me. But this is not the case with (C). It does appear in the simple present tense, but this refers to the instantaneous present, not durational present.
(10) A thought strikes me (=at this time In order to handle these facts in a systematic fashion, it is reasonable to relate the spatial and psychological uses by regarding the latter as a metaphorical extension of the former. In pursuing this possibility, let us begin with the pair (B) and (C).
(15) a. The idea strikes me. (B) (=The idea is striking to me.) b. An idea struck me. (C) (=An idea occurred to me.) The spatial counterparts for these seem to be the following. At this point one thing is to be noted in positing conceptual structures for these strike's. That is, the two conceptual structures must be such that they are related to each other in some straightforward way. In view of the native speakers' intuition, as well as the ease with which children learn (X) and (Y), it is necessary to unify the multiple uses of strike somewhere in the grammar in order to guarantee that (X) and (Y) are both 'strike's.
In this light, we propose that (X) and (Y) constitute a causative-ergative pair. This is not unreasonable in view of the fact that two uses of one and the same verb with the same morphology quite often constitute a causative-ergative pair among English verbs (e.g. hit, gallop, etc. See Hale and Keyser 1986) .
This analysis works well especially when we look at the two lexical entries. Consider (Y) first. 16b essentially means that a bullet came flying to the fence suddenly and forcefully. So this is a GO-verb. Interestingly enough, the qualification 'suddenly and forcefully' is crucial. The subject must denote something that swiftly comes of its own force.3 A bullet is well fitted. Even the object that is not so readily connected with this sense has to be so construed. Thus, in 17 the stick must have flown forcefully to the fence for the sentence to be semantically well-formed.
(17) A stick struck the fence. This restriction on the subject NP must be written in the lexical entry. We represent this by the semantic marker IMPACT. As a consequence, the lexical entry for strike (Y) looks like 18 (irrelevant details omitted).
[-N, +V]
The notations here essentially follow the conventions proposed in Jackendoff 1987b, c. Roman alphabet subscripts stipulate correspondence between syntactic and conceptual positions. Each conceptual constituent contains an appropriate semantic marker. So if a constituent is indexed, then only arguments that are compatible with this marker are fused into this position (Argument Fusion) in syntactic-conceptual mapping. If the reading of the syntactic constituent is incompatible, illformedness results (This is just the effect of 'selectional restrictions' in traditional terms. For details, see Jackendoff 1987b, c) . Now turning back to 18, the first argument of the GO-function has an index i, which ensures the correspondence with the syntactic position subject. So the subject NP must denote something which matches the feature Thing and the marker IMPACT, which explains the possible interpretations of 16b and 17.
Let us go on to strike (X). Its lexical entry is represented as follows:
The outermost function is a CAUSE which takes as its second argument the part corresponding to strike (Y). This instantiates our claim that strike (X) is the causative of strike (Y). It is to be noticed that the shared GO-function has not only the semantic structure but also the semantic marker intact for both strike's. Consequently, the marker IMPACT is present in the first argument slot of GO. However, since the subject position corresponds to the first argument of CAUSE this time, the index i is assigned there. So the conceptual position with IMPACT no longer corresponds to a syntactic position and Argument Fusion does not apply. As a result, IMPACT becomes an incorporated argument. Thus strike (X) means 'give an impact'. There is evidence for the adequacy of our analysis. When an instrumental with-phrase is added to strike (X), it must denote something which is held and manipulated by the subject throughout the action. A flying object such as a ball, which matches the marker IMPACT, is disallowed.
(20) a. He struck the fence with a stick.
b. *He struck the fence with a ball. From our point of view, this is a natural consequence. A ball in 20b, construed as flying to the fence, represents IMPACT. But IMPACT is already present in the verb's meaning. Hence a semantic clash occurs between these two IMPACTs.
Furthermore, syntactic phenomena argue in our favour. Consider first the typical 'incorporation' case. The verb paint incorporates PAINT. Green 1974 observes that 21 as it stands is bad because of redundancy. But when somewhat appropriately modified, the with-phrase can appear without any oddity.
(21) She painted the woodwork with paint.
paint I sold her. (Green 1974: 222) Because of redundancy the incorporated material cannot appear syn-tactically. But it may appear in the with-phrase when this with-phrase succeeds in adding nonredundant information. The with-phrase which thus realizes the incorporated material shows the following behavior, which is just that of an adjunct. First, the with-phrase appears outside of do-so. This is now generally taken to mean that the constituent is outside of the V'-complement.
(23) John painted the wall with black paint, and Mary did so with red paint. Next, extraction out of this with-phrase is impossible. And pied-piping is possible (For syntactic treatments within the GB framework, see Oka 1986) .
(24) a. *Red paint, I believe John painted the wall with. b. With red paint, I believe John painted the wall. Just the same syntactic phenomena are observable in the case of strike. Although realization of the incorporated material seems to be more severely constrained in this case than with paint, it is possible. A heavy blow in 25 seems to be a syntactic realization of IMPACT with nonredundant information.
(25) I struck John with a heavy blow.
(cf. ?*I struck John with a blow.) This with-phrase appears outside of do-so. And extraction out of this phrase is impossible, while pied-piping is O.K.
(26) John struck the fence with a hard blow, and I did so with a soft blow. (27) a. *A heavy blow, I believe he struck the fence with.
b. With a heavy blow, I believe he struck the fence. So the lexical entry 19 that we have posited on the basis of the causative hypothesis gets independent support from semantic and syntactic phenomena. After Argument Fusion applies to these entries, the indices and markers are deleted and the following conceptual structures result. The conceptual structures for strike's (X) and (Y) can be directly applied to the psychological counterparts (B) and (C). The structural relations should be constant, so we get the following semantic structures.
(30) An idea struck me (C) (=An idea occurred to me).
Notice that these conceptual structures, which are based on the parallelism with spatial strike, are intuitively appealing in enabling satisfactory paraphrases. In both 30 and 31, me is conceptualized as a psychological place. To be more specific, 'me' is equivalent to 'my mind'. The semantic marker IMPACT also exists within the first argument slot of GO. In 30, this serves to express the suddenness of my encounter with the idea, hence the meaning 'An idea suddenly came to my mind' obtains. On the other hand, the conceptual structure 31 basically means 'The idea gives a mental impact to my mind'. These paraphrases well capture the basic meanings of strike's (B) and (C).
Let us now turn to the remaining one, namely strike (A). Again, it is desirable to posit a structure which can be easily assimilated to those of other strike's. So we argue that strike (A) has the same semantic structure as strike (B), rather than (C), for in that case the number of conceptual positions matches that of syntactic positions. Apparently, strike (A) has three argument positions: subject, direct object and asphrase. If it also has three slots in conceptual structure as strike (B), then a clear correspondence becomes possible. This is a very desirable consequence.
Syntactic behavior also suggests that this as-phrase is to be regarded as an argument. When an adjunct with-phrase is added, it must necessarily follow the as-phrase and never precedes it. This indicates that the asphrase is in a lower hierarchy than the with-phrase. Probably it is a V'-complement.
(32) a. He strikes me as honest with his sincere words. b. *He strikes me with his sincere words as honest. Furthermore, extraction out of the as-phrase is possible.
(33) What I strike John as is nutty. (Bach (1979: 523) ) (34) What did Tom strike you as?
He struck me as being honest. From these, we conclude that the as-phrase is a complement. It follows then that the as-phrase corresponds to the first argument of GO.
(
35) Tom strikes me as being honest. (A) [CAUSE ([TOMi], [GO ([i HONEST], [TO ([I])])])]
Since the conceptualization pattern seems to be essentially the same across strike's (A) and (B), the correspondences of subject and direct object positions should be the same. So the only remaining possibility is to connect the as-phrase with this conceptual position. We thus finally come to the structure 35.4 2.4. CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURES FOR STRIKE. We now get the following conceptual structures for three strike's by combining the three elements that we have identified (EVENT/STATE, field, and semantic structure).
( ] Two remarks are in order here. First, the embedded GO-function is assigned the feature EVENT in 36 and 37 in order to express the relevant meaning. In both cases the arrival of the mental object, i.e. Tom's being honest or IMPACT, occurs in a moment and the resultant effect remains. This comes from the fundamental meaning of strike. As can be seen in the incompatibility with progressive aspect, it is basically a punctual verb.
(39) a. *John is striking me as being intelligent. b. *The article was striking Mary. Incidentally, note that the GO-function is assigned an EVENT with all three types. This means that all three types share not only the function but also the feature EVENT. Since we are assuming that (A) and (B) are causatives of (C) just as in the case of spatial strike, this is a welcome result. 3.3. STRUCTURE5 Since impress (A) is very much like strike (A), we are naturally led to expect that their semantic structures are identical. In fact, the as-phrase syntactically behaves exactly the same way. It is left to the adjunct with-phrase. And extraction out of it is allowed.
(45) a. He impresses me as being honest with his sincere words. b. *He impresses me with his sincere words as being honest.
(46) What did Tom impress you as? He impressed me as being honest. So we apply the results gained for strike's (A) and (B) to impress, thus assuming the same semantic structure.
CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURES FOR IMPRESS. Now the following conceptual structures result. (47) Tom impresses me as being honest. (A) (Cognitive field) [State CAUSE ([TOMi], [Event GO ([i HONEST], [TO ([I])])])] (48) The scene impresses me. (B) (Emotive field) [State CAUSE ([SCENE], [Event GO ([ADMIRATION], [TO ([I])])])]
Notice that the difference between (A) and (B) lies in the entity which goes to the person. Impress (B) has an incorporated argument ADMIRATION. The meaning is therefore 'give admiration to someone's mind', so his mind comes to be 'affected'. As a result, it acquires the status as an emotional reaction predicate. On the other hand, impress (A) only asserts that a certain idea, an impression, is transmitted to someone's mind. His or her mind is not affected so that the field is Cognitive.
The embedded GO-function is assigned the feature EVENT because impress is also a punctual verb, as can be seen from the incompatibility 5 Several dictionaries list the non-psychological use of impress. For instance, we find impress wax with a seal and impress a seal on wax in OALD: 426. However, recourse cannot be taken to the parallelism in this case, for it seems that in present day English this usage is rather old and that press is actually used instead.
Hence it is practically impossible to check the data by applying grammatical operations. One of my informants even made the remark that impress is used only in the psychological sense today.
with the progressive aspect.
(49) a. *John is impressing me as being intelligent.
b. *The article was impressing Mary.
4. IT-SUBJECT. Strike can also appear in the it-that construction.
(50) It struck me that he was honest. The status of this strike must be explicated. There are two possibilities. One is that this would be distinct from any of the three strike's (A), (B), or (C), which would thus necessitate a fourth type of strike (D). The other possibility is that it may be a mere variant of one of the three types. This is also the case with impress.
(51) It impressed me that John had read the whole story. So we are faced with the following questions: Do the strike in 50 and impress in 51 belong to any of the types so far considered or not? And if they do, which one?
In what follows we will show that strike in 50 is strike (C), and that impress in 51 is impress (B) with the that-clause being extraposed from subject position, by utilizing the three criteria (EVENT/STATE, field, and semantic structure).
EVENT/STATE. Strike (C) is eventive, and impress (B) is stative.
So it is expected that impress can be in the simple present, while strike cannot. However, 52 is found in the literature.
(52) It strikes me that Mary is unfriendly. This may appear to indicate the stativity of strike, which, however, turns out not to be the case. Notice that the simple present counts as a test in so far as it checks the duration of the state of affairs. But the simple present is ambiguous between durational and instantaneous present. This being the case, only the durational present counts as a reliable test. 52, however, undergoes only the instantaneous present interpretation; the speaker is reporting what has come to his mind just at the moment of speech. When the direct object is changed into a third person from a first person singular, the instantaneous present reading is no longer available.
(53) ??It strikes Pete that Mary is unfriendly. This is because one has access to only one's own current mental state. How can one be sure of what has just occurred in someone else's (i.e. Pete's) mind? Of course, it is possible to know about it later through some medium.
(54) It struck Pete that Mary was unfriendly. On the other hand, impress can occur in the simple durational present. So it corresponds to a STATE.
(55) It impresses Pete that Mary is kind.
4.2. FIELD. Although this has not been mentioned up to this point, the difference between Cognitive/Emotive has several consequences. The decisive point is the presence of certain selectional restrictions. The predicates in the Emotive field have two kinds of selectional restrictions, which are not shared by those in the Cognitive field. First, since emotive predicates are factives, the object of emotion must be something that is construed as already present. Certainly one cannot be surprised at, or impressed with something which he himself knows is non-existent. This is characteristic of factive predicates as a whole. Second, the object of emotion must be appropriate for the kind of emotion in question. Different emotions 'select' different objects. For instance, the object of surprise is totally different from that of pleasure. One is surprised at something that is unexpected and happens suddenly. But one is pleased with something that gives him satisfaction. These characteristics are inherent in each kind of emotion and are not interchangeable.
These restrictions become obvious especially with that-clauses. The first kind of restriction requires that the state of affairs denoted by the that-clause be already established with respect to the time of the predicate. In 56, however, John's winning is not so construed in the presence of the modal auxiliary; hence anomaly results.
(56) *?It surprised me that John would win. On the other hand, no such restriction exists in the Cognitive field. The object of predicates in this field is an idea, a cognitive entity. Take seem as a good example. It just means that a certain idea is present in someone's mind. The content of this idea need not be retroactive like an emotion and can be future-oriented. One can freely have an idea of something unrealized. So the modal indicative of unrealizedness can freely occur.
(57) It seemed that John would win. Let us go back to strike and impress. Since strike (C) is Cognitive and impress (B) is Emotive, we predict that impress and strike are just parallel to surprise and seem. This prediction is borne out as in 58 and 59. The second kind of restriction also confirms our thesis. Thus, as an emotional reaction predicate impress requires that its object be something to be favorable and admirable. 60 is bad because the presence of a fault is least likely to be interpreted as favorable.
(60) *It impressed me that there was a hole in that argument. Furthermore, the following contrast can be readily explained as arising from the difference between two types of impress.
(61) a. *It impresses me that Harry is incompetent.
b. Harry impresses me as being incompetent. 61a sounds absurd because someone's being incompetent is far from being admirable. 61b is not contradictory because it only asserts that the impression that Harry is incompetent is transmitted to me.
Besides selectional restrictions, the difference between Cognitive/ Emotive brings with it the following contrast. In 62, the it-subject of surprise is anaphoric, which is not the case with that of seem.6,7 (62) 5. RAISING ANALYSIS. Our discussion so far has been concerned with the distinctions of three strike's and two impress's. It is our contention that these distinctions must be incorporated into the grammar. It is to be expected then that any analysis neglecting these distinctions should it impressed me as obvious that John would win. (iii) NP* impressed me clause (Chomsky 1981: 109) Because impress can take an expletive-it subject as in (ii), Chomsky must have an LF representation like (iii). He further cites 68 as evidence supporting this analysis.
(68) I impressed themi [t as too critical of themi (*themselves, *each other)]. (Chomsky 1981: 198) With respect to the Binding Theory, NPs appearing in the as-phrase behave as if this phrase constituted a governing category. Pronominals can occur, whereas reflexives and reciprocals cannot. These could be clearly explained away by Binding Conditions A and B, if the as-phrase were a governing category. Strike is analyzed in an analogous manner.
(69) John strikes Mary as angry at himself (*him, her, *herself).
(70) John; strikes Mary [ti as angry at himself]. (Chomsky 1981: 290-91 ) As shown in 69, the as-phrase of strike also behaves as if it were clausal with respect to the binding facts. So Chomsky assumes a clausal ascomplement and takes strike to be a raising predicate.
However, these analyses immediately encounter problems, as Chomsky himself seems to admit. The putative 'raising' is quite restricted.
(71) a. *There impressed me as being a hole in that argument. b. *Tabs impressed me as having been kept on Melvin. c. *It impressed me as having snowed in Vermont. As seen in 71, 'non-referential expressions' cannot be 'raised': there, idiom chunks, weather-it, respectively. Chomsky himself uses these expressions as tests for clausal structure, so the data in 71 are serious problems indeed. The same is true of strike.
(72) a. It strikes me that there is a hole in that argument. b. It struck me that tabs were kept on Melvin.
c. It struck me that it in Vermont.
(73) a. *There strikes me as being a hole in that argument. b. *Tabs struck me as having been kept on Melvin. . This seems to be a viable alternative. Note that this analysis, based on independent grounds, also can account for the binding facts by assuming a clausal structure. For details, see Tanaka 1987 .
Yet from our point of view, it comes as no surprise that the raising analysis fails. Notice that the two verbs Chomsky tries to relate by the operation of raising are of two distinct types. In the case of impress, for instance, those in 71 belong to impress (A) while those in 74 are impress
